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IT'S AS CLEAR AS MUD: A CALL TO AMEND THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995
MATTHEW C. OESTERLE*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 19951 ("FTDA" or "Act"), put
simply, is intended to protect the distinctive quality of a famous trademark
from uses by third parties that diminish that distinctiveness. 2 The recent
cases of Savin Corp. v. Savin Group3 and Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue,
Inc. 4 exemplify the two ways in which the FTDA fails to fulfill this simple
goal of Congress. In Savin, the court explained that the Second Circuit
bifurcates the distinctive quality of a trademark that the Act protects, mak-
ing it harder to obtain relief under the Act.5 This interpretation of the
FTDA is contrary to the strict language of the Act 6 and the interpretation of
other Circuits.7 In Moseley, the Court interpreted the Act to require an
owner of a famous trademark to suffer actual harm before being granted
relief under the Act. 8 While this interpretation comports with the literal
language of the FTDA, it conflicts with much of the Act's legislative his-
tory and purpose.9 Together, these cases provide a compelling illustration
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006; M.S. Criminology and Criminal Justice,
University of Missouri, 1992. 1 would like to thank Professor Mickie Piatt and Editor-in-Chief Luke
Shannon for their valuable support and assistance, and Stacey Oesterle for her patience.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2000).
2. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
3. 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004).
4. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
5. 391 F.3d at 449 (explaining that to prevail under the Act, a plaintiff must show that his mark
possesses both inherent and acquired distinctiveness); accord TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar
Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2001).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) ("In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court
may consider factors such as, but not limited to ... the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the mark ... ").
7. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the inherent
distinctiveness of famous coined trademarks, like EXXON, and the acquired distinctiveness of famous
trademarks that are descriptive, like BEANIES).
8. 537 U.S. at 433-34 (holding that successful dilution claims require proof of actual dilution of
the senior mark and creating a controversy by stating that dilution may be shown by circumstantial
evidence, but failing to decide if identity of the marks is circumstantial evidence).
9. See infra Part IlI.B.
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of the need for Congress to amend the Act to provide a more consistent
method for determining which trademarks are protected under the Act, as
well as exactly what those trademarks are protected from.
A trademark is any word or symbol that is used to identify the source
of goods or services in the marketplace and to distinguish that source from
any other. 10 The law protects trademarks for three basic reasons: (1) to
protect consumers from deception as to the source, and presumably the
quality, of a product; (2) to protect a trademark owner's right to enjoy the
benefits of goodwill and reputation attached to a trademark; and (3) to
promote efficiency in the marketplace by allowing consumers to quickly
identify products that have been satisfactory or unsatisfactory in the past. "1
The "keystone" of trademark infringement protection has traditionally been
whether or not a junior user's 12 mark is likely to cause confusion in the
minds of the buying public. 13 To assess the likelihood of confusion be-
tween two marks, courts will generally look at several relevant factors: (1)
the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area
and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care and sophistication of
consumers in selecting the particular goods or services; (5) the strength of
the plaintiffs mark; (6) whether any actual confusion exists; and (7) the
defendant's intent to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.14 Infringe-
ment occurs when the use of a junior mark causes or is likely to cause a
purchaser to be confused about the origin of a product before, during, or
after a purchasing decision.' 5
10. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1 (4th
ed. 2005). Although a mark that identifies a service, rather than a good, is actually a service mark, the
legal treatment of trademarks and service marks is usually the same, id., and this article will refer to
both types of marks as trademarks or "marks."
11. Id. § 2:2.
12. In this article, a junior user is a party that uses a mark that is similar or identical to another
mark previously existing in the marketplace. A senior user is the party using that similar or identical
mark prior to the junior mark's entry into the marketplace and may also be referred to as a famous mark
owner.
13. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2:8; accord Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and Fitness,
Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
14. Sullivan v. CBS, Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2004); accord Brennan's, Inc. v. Bren-
nan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (dividing the area and manner of concurrent use
into two factors: the competitive proximity of the goods and the likelihood the plaintiff will "bridge the
gap" by offering products bearing the famous mark in closer proximity to the defendant's products);
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2002) (similar). The various Cir-
cuits formulate and apply these factors in a slightly different manner. Compare Sullivan, 385 F.3d at
776 (applying a seven-factor test) with Brennan's, 360 F.3d at 130 (applying an eight-factor test) and
Therma-Scan, 295 F.3d at 630 (applying a slightly different eight-factor test). See also Nautilus Group,
Inc., 372 F.3d at 1334 (explaining that in trademark cases, the Federal Circuit will apply the law of the
applicable regional Circuit).
15. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
"[ilnitial interest confusion occurs when the defendant uses the plaintiff's trademark 'in a manner
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Trademark dilution protection relies on an entirely different premise
than does the protection against infringement. Dilution occurs when the
junior use of a mark lessens "the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services." 16 Whereas trademark infringement is based
on consumer confusion, which "leads to immediate injury, ... dilution is
an infection, which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the adver-
tising value of the mark." 17 Accordingly, dilution protection is based on
protecting the famous mark's distinctive quality from dilution, regardless
of any consumer confusion as to the source of a product. 18 In fact, the
FTDA is intended "to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion." 19
Professor Frank Schechter, who wrote and testified before Congress
on the topic of dilution in the 1920s and 1930s, is generally credited with
introducing the notion of dilution protection for famous trademarks to the
United States. 20 Schechter professed that "the value of the modem trade-
mark lies in its selling power.... [T]his selling power depends . .. upon
[the trademark's] uniqueness and singularity,... [and] such uniqueness or
singularity is vitiated or impaired by its use upon either related or non-
related goods."'21 He reasoned that if a well-known trademark was associ-
ated with a product in the minds of the buying public, and then an identical
or similar mark was placed on a product from another source, even a non-
competing and completely unrelated product, the public would tend to
think of the former product when seeing the mark on the latter product. 22
Thus the second user would benefit, and a prior user would suffer, even if
the public never assumed the products were from a common source. 23 Ul-
calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a
result of the confusion."'); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (describing post-sale confusion, in which not the
purchaser, but a third party, is confused as to the source of an article leading them to believe the pur-
chaser has bought a particular brand they have not).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
17. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (citation omitted).
18. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trade-
mark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 794 (1997); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786,
801 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Dilution law, unlike traditional trademark infringement law.., is not based on a
likelihood of confusion standard, but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a holder has in
maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.") (citation omitted).
19. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029.
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:67.
21. Frank I Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831
(1927).
22. Id. at 831-32.
23. Id.
2006] 237
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timately, the prior user's mark would lose its selling power. Therefore, the
value of a famous mark to its owner would be diminished if other produc-
ers of goods began to designate their products with the same mark, even in
the absence of any consumer confusion as to the source of the goods. 24
Although not part of the common law tradition,25 several states began
to enact dilution statutes shortly after Congress enacted the Lanham Act,26
beginning with Massachusetts in 1947.27 Since then, thirty-five states have
enacted dilution statutes, 28 with many of them patterning the language of
their statute on the dilution prohibition of the Model Trademark Act.29
These state statutes all generally protect the distinctive quality of a trade-
mark from any junior use likely to cause dilution. 30 However, because any
junior use of a similar or identical mark will necessarily undermine a
trademark's singularity, the state statues typically provide protection from
two, 31 more narrowly defined, types of dilution: blurring and tarnishment. 32
Blurring occurs when a famous mark, which is capable of stimulating a
positive response in the buying public, and which is associated only with
the products of its owner, suffers a blurring of that stimulating effect due to
the use of the junior mark on different products from a different producer.33
24. Id. at 832.
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:78.
26. The Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), enacted as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, was the first
comprehensive Congressional Act to unify and codify various prior common law and statutory law on
unfair competition and trademark protection. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5:4.
27. Klieger, supra note 18, at 811; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 OB, § 12 (1999).
28. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:80. The states with an anti-dilution statute as of 2004 are:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at n.2.
29. Id. §§ 24:80-24:81. The Model Trademark statute is section 12 of the 1964 United States
(now International) Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill, revised in 1992 to incorporate
changes to federal trademark law proposed in 1988 but never enacted. Id. § 24:81.
30. Klieger, supra note 18, at 812-13.
31. A third, more recent type of dilution occurs through "cybersquatting." See Mark R. Becker,
Streamlining the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Truly Famous Marks, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1387, 1399 (2000). This article does not explore this third conceptualization of dilution, which is gov-
erned by a separate provision in the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). Cybersquatting is typi-
cally not resolved in the courts, but by a dedicated arbitration system created by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") via its Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 13 (Feb. 1, 2005),
http://www.chicagoip.com/longdilution.pdf.
32. Klieger, supra note 18, at 823.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995); see also Nabisco, Inc. v.
P.F. Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding preliminary injunction and finding that a
competing fish-shaped, cheese flavored cracker likely lessened the distinctiveness of the famous
GOLDFISH crackers).
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As an example, a new dry-cleaning chain called STARBUCKS 34 is
unlikely to be confused with the ubiquitous coffee shop chain; however, the
dry-cleaner may cause blurring because the public will no longer associate
the famous STARBUCKS name solely with the coffee company. Tarnish-
ment occurs when a junior mark's placement on a product creates an inher-
ently negative and unsavory association for the owner of the famous
mark. 35 For instance, if the proprietor of an adult novelty store named his
shop DISNEY'S WORLD, the famous DISNEYWORLD mark, associated
around the world with family entertainment, would be tarnished by the
association, even though no consumer would confuse DISNEYWORLD
with the adult novelty store.
The FTDA, enacted in 1996, is the first federal protection against
trademark dilution. 36 The FTDA, which is not intended to pre-empt state
dilution statutes, 37 differs from the state statutes in two significant respects:
it requires that senior marks be not only distinctive, but also famous; and
the literal language of the Act requires that the owner of a famous mark
prove that the junior mark actually caused dilution rather than just proving
the junior mark was likely to cause dilution.38 These two distinctions have
led to a confused and uncertain application of the FTDA. They have frus-
trated the fulfillment of the purposes for which Congress enacted the FTDA
in the first place.
This article examines the FTDA and its shortcomings, and proposes a
plan to improve the Act to better meet Congress's objectives for it. Part I
lays a foundation for examining the Act by reviewing the status of state
trademark dilution protection at the time the FTDA was passed. Part II
reviews Congress's 1988 decision to forgo instituting federal trademark
dilution protection, the history of the FTDA, Congress's motivations for
passing the Act, and the effect the Act was meant to have in the protection
of national trademarks. Part III recounts the Act's failure to live up to those
goals, illustrating the need for amendment. Lastly, Part IV suggests a two-
part plan to amend the Act to improve its effectiveness in meeting the
needs of famous mark owners. First, the amendment would create a new
famous trademark register that would provide a presumption of fame; and
34. This article will follow the convention of listing trademarks in all capital letters.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(b).
36. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:83.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (stating
that the FTDA "would not pre-empt existing state dilution statutes. State laws could continue to be
applied in cases involving locally famous or distinctive marks.").
38. Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Con-
fusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121, 125-26 (1996).
2006]
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second, it would permit injunctive relief upon the showing of likelihood of
dilution rather than only after proof of actual dilution. Part IV also dis-
cusses the shortcomings of an amendment to the FTDA currently pending
before Congress.
I. STATE OF TRADEMARK DILUTION PROTECTION PRIOR TO THE FTDA
Trademark dilution protection originated at the state level in the
United States. 39 Accordingly, a brief review of dilution protection under
state law prior to the passage of the FTDA is relevant to the examination of
the Act itself. The notion of trademark dilution first began to emerge in
U.S. case law in the well-known New York case of Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany
Productions, Inc. 40 In that case, a state court enjoined a movie theatre from
using the famous jeweler's name.4 1 The case is significant because, despite
evidence showing actual consumer confusion regarding the affiliation of
the theatre, the court's reasoning in granting the injunction was not ex-
plained in the language of trademark infringement, as had been characteris-
tic of previous trademark cases. 42 Rather, the court reasoned that well-
known marks need to be protected against uses that dissociate them from
the particular products with which they have been used, thereby firmly
expressing its approval of protecting famous marks from dilution. 43 In fact,
the court, quoting Professor Schechter, stated that "[tihe real injury in such
cases of non-competitive products is the gradual whittling away ... of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
noncompeting goods. '44
Fifteen years later, in 1947, state dilution statutes began to appear and
have since been enacted in thirty-five states. 45 Despite the proliferation of
state statutes and early support for dilution remedies in cases like Tiffany &
Co. however, the statutes have often provided inadequate protection for
many famous trademark owners, particularly owners of nationally famous
marks. After enactment of the first state dilution law, but prior to the pas-
sage of the FTDA, courts were generally reluctant to apply dilution statutes
literally,46 and were at times openly hostile towards the concept of dilu-
39. See generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531
(1991) (examining the state of trademark dilution law in 1991).
40. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932).
41. Id. at 683.
42. Id. at 681.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 681-82 (quoting from Schechter, supra note 21, at 825).
45. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:80.
46. Klieger, supra note 18, at 815.
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tion.47 In fact, of 159 state law dilution claims to reach federal circuit
courts of appeal between 1977 and 1993, only ten cases resulted in a pre-
liminary injunction where dilution formed at least a partial ground for the
relief.48 Furthermore, only four cases resulted in a permanent injunction
based solely on the violation of a state dilution statute.49
Even when courts did enforce state dilution laws, they were often
hesitant to grant injunctions beyond state boundaries. 50 This reluctance to
impose nationwide injunctions was rooted in the interests of comity, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that many states did not provide dilution re-
lief.51 As a result, an undisputedly famous mark like the JOHN DEERE
logo, familiar throughout the country, was refused nationwide injunctive
relief under the New York dilution statute. 52 The court reached this conclu-
sion despite clear precedent that it was within the court's power to grant
nationwide injunctive relief for violation of the New York dilution law.53
Additionally, other courts refused to grant any injunctive relief under state
dilution statutes in cases where other remedies were available under non-
dilution claims in the case. 54
This treatment of dilution claims often left the owners of famous
marks with little hope of meaningful relief, and led to forum shopping and
an increase in litigation. 55 In response, trademark owners and their advo-
cates called for federal-level dilution protection, which was expected to be
effective, predictable, and more faithfully applied by the courts than state
dilution law had been.56
47. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution
Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 433, 439 (1994).
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2322, 1995 WL 81299, at 5-6, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2278, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1995).
51. Id. at 2 (referring to dilution as a "novel" theory of relief).
52. Id. at 6. The court weighed several factors in refusing to grant a nationwide injunction, giving
particular weight to the fact "that neither party claim[ed] any special relationship to New York." Id. The
New York dilution law construed in this opinion was codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 368-d
(McKinney 1996), but was repealed effective January 1, 1997.
53. Deere & Co., 1995 WL 81299, at 5.
54. See, e.g., Berghoff Rest. Co. v. Lewis W. Berghoff, Inc., 499 F.2d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1974)
(stating in dicta that if injunctive relief was available for trademark infringement on similar goods under
federal law, no injunction against dilution need be granted under state law).
55. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31.
56. United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Comm., Report and Recommenda-
tion to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REp. 375, 455 (1987) [hereinafter
USTA Report].
2006]
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II. HISTORY OF THE FTDA AND CONGRESS'S MOTIVATIONS FOR
ENACTING IT
The effective and predictable federal dilution protection desired by
trademark owners was expected to come from the FTDA. The Act entitles
owners of famous trademarks to injunctive relief against others' use of their
famous marks in a "commercial use in commerce, '57 if that use began after
the mark became famous and that commercial use "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark."'58 The Act lists eight nonexclusive factors
the court may rely upon when determining if a mark is famous for purposes
of the Act:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks' [sic] owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 59
Despite listing these factors for determining fame, the Act's only
guidance in determining whether the junior use of the mark has caused
dilution comes in the form of the statutory definition of dilution: "the less-
ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between
the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confu-
sion, mistake, or deception."'60
57. A "commercial use in commerce" is the use of a mark as a designation of source in order to
sell goods or services to which it is attached. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th
Cir. 2002).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
[Vol 81:235
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The Act contains affirmative defenses: for fair use of the mark "by
another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion" to
identify competing goods and services; for noncommercial use of the mark;
and for use of the mark in all manner of news reporting and commentary. 61
Furthermore, the Act bars claims brought under state statutes or common
law against owners of marks registered with the federal Trademark Of-
fice.62 Lastly, in cases where the diluting party willfully traded on the repu-
tation of the owner of the famous mark or intentionally caused dilution, the
Act entitles owners of famous marks to damages incurred, the defendant's
profits, costs, attorney's fees, and, possibly, court-ordered destruction of
the diluting articles. 63
A. History of the Act
The adoption of the FTDA revolves around two principal events: (1)
the consideration and passage of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988,64 the first consideration Congress gave to the language of the FTDA;
and (2) the consideration and passage of the FTDA itself in 1995.65
1. The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
The most direct roots of federal level protection for owners of famous
marks can be traced to two events in 1987. In June of that year, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided the case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United State Olympic Committee,66 and in September the United States
Trademark Association ("USTA") 67 published its Report and Recommen-
dations for the first comprehensive review and update of the U.S. trade-
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). The Act bars state law claims against marks registered in any of the
three federal registers: the principal register, the register subsequent to the Act of March 3, 1881, and
the register subsequent to the Act of February 20, 1905. Id. These three registers will be referred to in
this article collectively as "federal registration" or "the principal register."
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(2), 1117(a), 1118. The court may, depending on the circumstances of
the case, also award treble damages.
64. See infra Part II.A.1.
65. See infra Part II.A.2.
66. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). The USTA cited this case as laying a foundation for federal dilution
protection within existing federal trademark law in its Statement on the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988, submitted to the House Subcommitte on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice
during the hearing on that Act. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4156 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 82 (1988) (statement of the United States Trademark Assoc.) [hereinafter 1988 Hearing].
67. The USTA changed its name to the International Trademark Association ("INTA") in 1993.
See International Trademark Association, History, http://www.inta.org/about/history.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2005).
2006]
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mark system.68 The Olympic Committee Court considered whether a pri-
vate athletic association could be enjoined from using the word "Olympic"
in its commercial activity pursuant to the Amateur Sports Act.69 In its opin-
ion, the Court stated in dicta that Congress would be within its power to
conclude that "unauthorized uses [of famous trademarks], even if not con-
fusing, nevertheless may harm the [owners] by lessening the distinctiveness
and thus the commercial value of the marks."' 70 This case gave a boost to
proponents of a federal trademark dilution statute.
Shortly thereafter, in its Report and Recommendation, the USTA laid
out its plan to overhaul U.S. trademark law. 71 The USTA suggested that
although then-current federal trademark law had generally accommodated
contemporary "business and commercial practices and realities," there were
limited exceptions that Congress should address. 72 One of these exceptions
was in the area of trademark dilution, and the USTA recommended that
Congress act to adopt a federal dilution law to "better serve present day
commercial needs."' 73 The USTA noted that it had included dilution protec-
tion in the Model State Trademark Bill 74 since 1964 and, accordingly, had
"strongly influenced" a number of states to adopt protections from dilution
for distinctive marks. 75 It specifically recommended that, as in the model
state law, "likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a [registered] mark" should be a ground for injunctive
relief, even if the diluting mark is used on noncompeting goods and regard-
less of the presence or absence of confusion as to the source of the goods. 76
The USTA justified the need for a national dilution statute by review-
ing the condition of state trademark dilution law at the time and pointing to
the shortcomings of state law, particularly as applied to national trade-
marks. 77 It described the history of state statutory dilution protection as
68. See generally USTA Report, supra note 56. The House Report on the 1988 Act explicitly
stated that the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 was based on the recommendations of the USTA
in this report. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 3 (1988).
69. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. at 526-27. See Amateur Sports Act, now incorporated in the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000).
70. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. at 539. The Court also quoted the foundational work of Professor
Schechter.
71. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 375.
72. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 387.
73. Id.
74. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 454. USTA first promulgated the Model State Trademark Bill
in 1949 to guide state legislators and executives. International Trademark Association, Guide to Under-
standing the Model State Trademark Bill, http://www.inta.org/policy/mstb-guide.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2005).
75. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 454.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 454-55.
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"fitful,"78 and noted that courts had only infrequently granted relief solely
due to dilution under state statutes. 79 It went on to observe that state court
decisions had been inconsistent and characterized their reasoning as "often
illogical." 80 This history, combined with the fact that approximately half
the states lacked any dilution legislation, led to a "trademark protection
vacuum in the United States," necessitating federal legislation to protect
truly famous trademarks. 81
The next significant step towards the enactment of the FTDA occurred
the following year when Congress considered the Trademark Law Revision
Act of 1988 ("TLRA"). 82 The TLRA was a comprehensive act intended to
accomplish the general overhaul of federal trademark legislation proposed
by the USTA in its report of the prior year. 83 The version of the TLRA
originally passed by the Senate was modeled closely on the USTA Report
and included provisions creating a federal trademark dilution cause of ac-
tion.84 After changing the phrasing of the proposed dilution provision in a
few minor respects, the Senate approved the TLRA by voice vote and
passed it to the House for consideration. 85 The House ultimately approved
the TLRA, but not before removing several provisions, including the crea-
tion of a dilution cause of action. 86
The House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admini-
stration of Justice removed the trademark dilution language before passing
78. Id. The Report noted that Massachusetts had passed the first state dilution statute forty years
prior to its report, yet only about half of the states had adopted a dilution statute.
79. Id. at 455. The Report found that courts had often relied on tamishment as a basis for relief
under state statutes and that this was not consistent with the classical concept of dilution proposed by
Prof. Schechter. Although dilution under the FTDA has been interpreted to encompass both blurring
and tamishment, see Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 425 (2003), the original
proposal of the USTA included separate prohibitions against tarnishment and dilution (blurring). See
USTA Report, supra note 56, at 435, 453.
80. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 455.
81. Id. The Report characterized truly famous marks as "enormously valuable but fragile assets,
susceptible to irreversible injury from promiscuous use," and the most likely marks to be harmed by
reduced distinctiveness. Id. Notably, the original USTA recommendation restricted protection to fa-
mous marks that had been registered with the U.S. Trademark Office. Id. This requirement was re-
moved from the final FTDA through an amendment by Rep. P. Schroeder after the Patent and
Trademark Office testified that limiting protection to registered marks would put the U.S. at a disadvan-
tage in negotiations for international protection of famous U.S. marks. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4
(1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
82. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072.
83. See S. REp. No. 100-515, at 2-3 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5578-79.
84. Id. at 19, 22. The substantive provisions of this federal dilution law, as well as much of the
language, was taken directly from the USTA Report. Compare id., with USTA Report, supra note 56, at
458-59.
85. 134 CONG. REC. S5864-S5870 (1988).
86. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 3935.
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the TLRA to the full Judiciary Committee after determining that the provi-
sion was too controversial in two respects. 87 First, the Subcommittee noted
the numerous objections to dilution legislation that it had received from
broadcasters, publishers, consumer advocates, and other parties concerned
that a dilution provision would inhibit news reporting and commentary
protected under the First Amendment. 88 Second, those who objected also
expressed great concern that the dilution legislation would prohibit legiti-
mate comparative advertising. 89 Interestingly, the Subcommittee did not
base its objection to dilution protection on a concern that the protection
would confer too broad of an entitlement on trademark owners or that it
relies on an entirely different rationale than trademark infringement protec-
tion.90 The Subcommittee voiced no concerns of this sort, despite hearing
testimony that "the dilution provision inverts traditional theories of trade-
mark law for no good purpose" and "creates a remedy where there is no
real wrong." 9 1 The U.S. Department of Commerce, of which the Patent and
Trademark Office is an agency, neither endorsed nor opposed adding dilu-
tion protection to federal trademark law.92
2. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
Congress next took up the cause of federal trademark dilution protec-
tion in March 1995 when Representative Carlos Moorhead, the sponsor of
the 1988 TLRA, introduced the FTDA into the House. 93 The text of the
FTDA, as introduced, was virtually identical to the legislation the USTA
87. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 5-7 (1988).
88. Id. The version of the TLRA passed by the Senate included no specific affirmative defense for
fair use, news reporting, or noncommercial use as the FTDA does; it only provided that in issuing
injunctions, the court should take into account "the good faith use of an individual's name or an indica-
tion of geographic origin." S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 67.
89. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 5-7. Notably, the USTA stated in its Report that "[it did] not
intend the dilution provision to inhibit the use of the registrant's mark by a competitor in a comparative
or informational manner. It should not be used to discourage otherwise lawful comparative advertising."
USTA Report, supra note 56, at 462. However, neither the USTA, nor the bill's sponsor, Rep. C.
Moorhead, inserted such an explicit provision into the bill.
90. H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 5-7.
91. See 1988 Hearing, supra note 66, at 127 (statement of Roberta Jacobs-Meadway, partner,
Panitch Schwarze Jacobs & Nadel, Philadelphia, PA). Ralph Brown, Professor of Law, Yale University
School of Law, also testified against the dilution provision. The bulk of his criticism was directed
towards the concern that the provision would inhibit free speech in commentary and comparative
advertising. He also felt dilution was an area of the law better handled by the state and that the Sub-
committee should solicit more input before acting on this issue. Id. at 95-99.
92. Id. at 164 (opinion of the General Counsel of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, submitted in
writing only).
93. SeeH.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995).
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proposed in its Report eight years earlier, with two notable differences. 94
First, the new dilution bill required that a junior user's alleged dilution of a
famous mark must be a "commercial use in commerce" 95 of the mark,
rather than simply the "use in commerce" that the original USTA proposal
required. 96 This subtle change in language precludes the FTDA's dilution
protection from applying to the use of a mark that is a parody, yet offered
commercially. 97 Second, the new bill proposed a new section 43(c)(4),
which created an affirmative defense to a claim of dilution for fair use of
another's mark in comparative advertising or promotion to identify compet-
ing goods and for noncommercial use of a mark.98 Both of these changes
were obviously aimed at dispelling the apprehension created by the dilution
provisions originally included in the 1988 TLRA by ensuring that famous
marks could be used in parody and comparative advertising. 99
After the FTDA's introduction in the House, the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property conducted a hearing on July 19, 1995.100
Testimony at the hearing was overwhelmingly in favor of the bill.101 While
supporting the FTDA, Philip Hampton, the Assistant Commissioner for
Trademarks in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") criticized it
for limiting dilution protection to marks registered with the PTO. 102 He
testified that a federal dilution statute was intended to prevent the weaken-
ing of famous trademarks, and that there was no reason, consistent with
that goal, to limit protection to marks already registered.103 Furthermore,
Hampton asserted that limiting protection of famous marks to those already
94. Compare H.R.1295, 104th Cong. (as introduced) with USTA Report, supra note 56, at 458-
59.
95. A "commercial use in commerce" is the use of a mark as a designation of source in order to
sell goods or services to which it is attached. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th
Cir. 2002).
96. H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (as introduced).
97. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 906-07 (finding a song parodying the famous Mattel doll
BARBIE to be a noncommercial use in commerce of the mark).
98. H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (as introduced).
99. See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
Hearing on H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 37 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Hearing] (prepared statement of
Philip G. Hampton, Asst. Comm. for Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
100. Id. at 1.
101. See generally id. While Jonathan Moskin, an attorney with the New York intellectual property
law firm Pennie & Edmonds at the time of the hearings, criticized the new version of the dilution
legislation as failing to provide a clear and useful definition of dilution, he did support a "uniform
means of enhancing protection for the economic value of nationally famous trademarks." Id. at 158
(emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 32 (prepared statement of Philip G. Hampton, Asst. Comm. for Trademarks, U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office).
103. Id. at 30 (testimony of Philip G. Hampton).
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registered was not in "the spirit of the United States' position as a leader in
the fight for strong world-wide protection of intellectual property."104 More
importantly, he explained, to do so would undercut the United State's posi-
tion with its trading partners that famous marks should be 'protected
whether or not the marks are registered in the country where protection is
sought.105 The United States had been lobbying foreign nations to protect
marks owned by U.S. companies, whether registered in the foreign nation
or not. 10 6 Along with his testimony, Commissioner Hampton offered a
proposed amendment to the FTDA to include protection for non-registered
marks. 107
After the hearings, the Subcommittee approved two amendments to
the bill before sending it to the full House for consideration. 108 Representa-
tive Moorhead offered an amendment to add use in news reporting and
news commentary to the two existing affirmative defenses of fair use and
noncommercial use. 1°9 More notably, Representative Patricia Schroeder
offered an amendment adopting Commissioner Hampton's proposed
amendment to not restrict dilution protection to registered marks. 110 The
full House then passed the bill111 and referred it to the Senate, where it
quickly passed by unanimous voice vote without referral to committee and
with minimal debate. 112 President Clinton signed the FTDA on January 16,
1996.113
B. Congress's Motivation for Passing the FTDA
Congress had three principle motivations for enacting the FTDA: (1)
to create a nationwide cause of action, with nationwide injunctive relief, for
the dilution of trademarks used nationwide;1 14 (2) to create consistency in
104. Id. at 32 (prepared statement of Philip G. Hampton).
105. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Philip G. Hampton).
106. Id. at 30 (testimony of Philip G. Hampton).
107. Id. Apart from broadening protection from registered marks to all marks, Hampton's proposed
amendment added registration in a federal trademark registry as a factor for courts to consider in deter-
mining the fame of a mark. Id. at 63-64 (appendix to prepared statement of Philip G. Hampton).
108. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 141 Cong. Rec. H14318 (1995).
112. 141 Cong. Rec. S 19312 (1995). Sen. Patrick Leahy informed the Senate that it had considered
and passed a similar bill in 1988, that the legislation was intended to strengthen the hand of U.S. trade
negotiators, and that the bill now contained an affirmative defense for fair use and for news reporting
and commentary. Id.
113. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
114. See infra Part 1II.1.
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trademark dilution law; 1 5 and (3) to comply with the requirements of in-
ternational agreements. 16
1. Creating a National Cause of Action for Dilution of National Marks
Congress's first principle motivation in enacting the FTDA was to
create a federal cause of action to protect famous marks that are used on a
national basis and, accordingly, to provide national relief."17 Thus, Con-
gress apparently adopted wholesale a chief motivation behind the USTA's
inclusion of a dilution provision in its original Recommendation and Re-
port in 1987.118 The House Report on the FTDA observed that famous
marks are ordinarily used on a nationwide basis; yet before passage of the
FTDA, dilution protection was only available "on a patch-quilt" basis be-
cause half of the states had no legislation to grant relief from dilution, and
in states that did protect marks from dilution the specific details of that
protection varied. 19 This statement echoes the testimony of the Interna-
tional Trademark Association ("INTA") and the ABA Section of Intellec-
tual Property, both of which asserted that the FTDA would promote more
uniformity in the treatment of national famous marks, allowing owners of
those marks to better plan their use of those valuable marks. 120
A distinct advantage of a federal cause of action for famous marks in
nationwide use is that the owners of the marks may obtain national injunc-
tive relief. In floor debate immediately prior to the House's passage of the
FTDA, Representative Moorhead observed that oftentimes courts are reluc-
tant to grant nationwide injunctions for violations of state law, particularly
when half of the states have no dilution law at all. 121 This situation, which
in many cases denied the owners of famous marks meaningful relief from
dilution, was another core reason for INTA's endorsement of the FTDA.122
115. See infra Part II.B.2.
116. See infra Part II.B.3.
117. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
118. Compare H.R. REP. No. 104-374 with USTA Report, supra note 56, at 455.
119. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4.
120. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 72-73, 128 (testimony of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice
President of INTA, and prepared statement of Thomas E. Smith, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property,
ABA, respectively).
121. 141 Cong. Rec. H14318 (1995).
122. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 78 (prepared statement of Mary Ann Alford). See also Blue
Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding
that "considerations of comity among the states favor limited out-of-state application of exclusive rights
acquired under domestic law, and a district court does not err when it takes a restrained approach to the
extraterritorial application of such rights"); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2322, 1995
WL 81299, at 5, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2278, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1995) (noting that "[i]nterests of
comity, however, strongly favor a limited injunction" because only approximately half the states have
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Assistant Commissioner Hampton observed that injunctions under the
FTDA would be clearly enforceable throughout the nation, in every
state. 123
2. Inconsistent Court Decisions
The House Report noted that the court decisions in the area of trade-
mark dilution had been inconsistent, and this inconsistency had led to fo-
rum-shopping and increased litigation. 124 The FTDA was intended to help
stabilize this area of law and provide consistency, particularly with regard
to determining the fame of a mark. 125 The list of specific factors for courts
to use in assessing fame, which were absent from the Model State Statute,
were expected to result in a consistent analysis of what constitutes a fa-
mous mark. 126 The Act was also expected to clarify the divergent defini-
tions of dilution then found in various different courts. 127 Furthermore,
prior to the passage of the FTDA, courts had, at times, been openly hostile
to state dilution statutes. 128 This led to a substantial lack of dilution relief
under the state statutes. 129 In its original 1988 Recommendation, the USTA
suggested that courts would more enthusiastically embrace a national cause
of action. 130 The House Report was clear in its conviction that protection
for famous marks should not depend on where a lawsuit is filed. 131
Although not explicitly stated, Congress also clearly intended the
FTDA to encourage trademark owners to register their marks in the princi-
pal register. By providing a defense to any state law dilution claim to marks
in the federal registers, the FTDA gives greater certainty to mark owners
dilution laws and "even those states with such laws might not restrict commercial use of trademarks that
do not confuse consumers or blur or tarnish the trademark").
123. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 31 (testimony of Philip G. Hampton).
124. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4.
125. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 2 (opening statement of Rep. Carlos Moorhead, Subcomm.
Chairman).
126. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7; accord USTA Report, supra note 56, at 460.
127. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 2 (opening statement of Representative Carlos Moorhead,
Chairman of the Subcommittee). Some courts had required a showing of likelihood of confusion,
despite statutory language to the contrary. See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1209 (1st Cir. 1983). Other courts held that dilution only applied to non-
competitive and non-confusing uses of a famous mark. See, e.g., AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart
Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611,619 (7th Cir. 1993).
128. Port, supra note 47, at 439.
129. Id. at 441 (noting that between 1977 and early 1994, "the issue of trademark dilution ha[d]
arisen 159 times in the federal circuit courts of appeal." Of the original 159 cases, only ten cases re-
sulted in a preliminary injunction with dilution as a partial ground (the other grounds being likelihood
of confusion). Only four cases actually resulted in a sustained injunction based solely on a dilution
statute. Of those four, three were from Illinois).
130. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 455.
131. H.R.REP.No. 104-374, at4.
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who have registered their marks in the federal system, thereby encouraging
them to do so. 132
3. Complying with International Agreements
Congress was further motivated to enact the FTDA by a desire to
comply with the requirements of international agreements protecting intel-
lectual property, to which the United States is a signatory. It also antici-
pated that enacting the FTDA to better protect famous marks used in the
United States would increase the likelihood that foreign governments
would protect famous marks used by .U.S. companies in international
commerce. These motivations were explicitly stated in the House Report,
where the Judiciary Committee stated that the FTDA was "consistent with
the terms" of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"). 133 Thus, because the FTDA was
passed, in part, to harmonize U.S. law with these Agreements, a brief re-
view of the Agreements' implications for trademark dilution protection is
in order.
The Paris Convention, originally established in 1883, provides protec-
tion for a broad range of intellectual property, including trademarks, within
signatory nations.134 It contains a provision granting a higher level of pro-
tection for famous marks, which it describes as "well known" in a particu-
lar country, than it does for marks that are not well-known. 135 The
Convention requires member nations, upon request of a mark owner or on
their own initiative, to refuse or cancel the registration of a mark that con-
stitutes a "reproduction, imitation or translation" of a well-known mark,
132. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 82 (prepared statement of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice
President of INTA); accord 1988 Hearing, supra note 66, at 83 (statement of the United States Trade-
mark Assoc.).
133. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4. The TRIPS Agreement was a result of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations for the revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, conducted from 1986 to
1994 and finalized on April 15, 1994. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations: Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. The Paris Convention, as modified, was the
first international agreement protecting intellectual property and is administered by the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization ("WIPO"). See WIPO, Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (1883), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary-paris.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2005).
134. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6bis, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
135. Id. at art. 6bis. The terms "well-known mark" and "famous mark" are not explicitly equated in
the Paris Convention or in TRIPS (neither agreement uses the term "famous mark" at all), but the
House Report on the FTDA implicitly equated them by describing TRIPS and the Paris Convention as
protection famous marks. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4.
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and requires that member nations prohibit the use of such a mark.136 How-
ever, the Convention restricts this heightened protection of well-known
marks to those "liable to create confusion" and used on identical or similar
goods to those on which the well known mark is used. 137 Accordingly, the
Paris Convention alone, despite its special provisions for well-known
marks, does not protect such marks as much from pure dilution as from
traditional infringement. 138
TRIPS, however, incorporates and broadens the protection for well-
known marks laid out in the Paris Convention. First, TRIPS extends protec-
tion to service marks, as well as marks used on goods. 139 More importantly
for a discussion of dilution, TRIPS specifies that the Paris Convention pro-
tection of well-known marks now applies even when a junior mark is used
on goods or services dissimilar to those on which the well-known mark is
used. 140 Furthermore, TRIPS does not require that the use of the junior
mark be likely to cause confusion, but only that it indicate a "connection"
between the goods on which the junior mark is used and the well-known
mark owner, and that the "interests" of the well-known mark owner are
likely to be damaged by the junior use. 141 The junior use of marks identical
or similar to well-know marks (thus prohibited by TRIPS) is quite similar
to the classic description of dilution articulated by Professor Schechter and
prohibited by the FTDA. 142
While the requirements of TRIPS and the Paris Convention were an
explicit motivation for Congress's passage of the FTDA, the passage of the
Act was also implicitly motivated by a general pattern of Congressional
action intended to better integrate U.S. law with international intellectual
property protection. 143 For instance, the House conducted its hearing on the
FTDA concurrently with its hearing on the Madrid Protocol Implementa-
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part i.
139. TRIPS, Article 16, supra note 133, at 1203-04.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra Introduction; supra Part II. TRIPS does not define what constitutes a "connection"
between the goods of the junior user and the well-known mark owner, but a plausible interpretation is
that it is similar to the "mental association," discussed in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418, 433 (2003), in a member of the public between the junior user and the famous mark owner. TRIPS
does not elaborate on what constitutes a well-known mark owner's "interests" either, but a loss of good
will through blurring or tamishment certainly seems to fit within the meaning.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (de-
scribing the United States as a "leader setting the standards for strong worldwide protection of intellec-
tual property"); see also David S. Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and
Canada: Inexorable Trend or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 63, 64
(2000).
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tion Act, soliciting testimony on both Acts. 144 The Madrid Protocol pro-
vides a system by which mark owners may register their marks in all mem-
ber nations upon the filing of a single application with their own national or
regional trademark office. 145 Additionally, the House Report stated that
adopting the FTDA would assist the executive branch in negotiations with
foreign countries to secure greater protection for famous marks owned by
U.S. companies and used in foreign trade. 146 It went on to observe that
foreign countries had been reluctant to enact protection for famous U.S.
marks when the U.S. had not done 50,147 further supporting the contention
that Congress desired to harmonize U.S. law with foreign intellectual prop-
erty protection. Consistent with this Congressional goal, any amendment to
the FTDA to address the problems set out in the next section must be made
with a view to the current state and likely direction of foreign and interna-
tional trademark dilution protections.
III. FAILURE OF THE FTDA TO FULFILL CONGRESS'S GOALS
Three developments in the adjudication of federal dilution cases have
frustrated the realization of Congress's objectives in enacting the FTDA.
The federal courts 148 have demonstrated inconsistency, and some difficulty,
in determining when a mark is famous for purposes of the Act, with the
circuits developing diverse, and often conflicting, lines of precedent. 14 9
Also, FTDA case law reveals a struggle to define dilution and how plain-
tiffs can prove it.150 Furthermore, the Supreme Court case of Moseley v. V.
Secret Catalogue, Inc. 15 1 has shown a bright light on a logical inconsis-
144. See generally 1995 Hearing, supra note 99. Apart from the FTDA and the Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act, Congress enacted other legislation in the 1990s to better integrate U.S. intellectual
property law with that of other countries. For example, in 1998 Congress enacted the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (enacted at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 301-305), to extend copyright protection under U.S. law to the same term as that provided under
European law-the life of the author plus seventy years. See 144 CONG. REC. S12434 (1998) (com-
ments of Senator Thompson), and 144 CONG. REC. H9949 (1998) (comments of Representative Jack-
son-Lee).
145. See World Intellectual Property Org., Madrid System for the International Registration of
Marks, http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). The Madrid Protocol (1989) was
an update to the Madrid Agreement (1891) and collectively form the Madrid System for the Interna-
tional Registration of Marks.
146. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4.
147. Id.
148. Long, supra note 31, at 18 (analyzing judicial treatment of the FTDA and concluding, based
on statistical data, "that the state courts are not playing a significant role in the enforcement of dilution
claims and the development of federal dilution law").
149. See infra Part III.A.
150. See infra Part III.B.
151. 537U.S. 418(2003).
20061
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tency in the language of the Act. 152 These three aspects of FTDA jurispru-
dence have prevented the Act from fulfilling Congress's goals for it.
A. Difficulty of Determining Fame
As explained above, protection under the FTDA is limited to famous
marks. Accordingly, determining the fame of a mark is a crucial step in
granting relief under the Act. To guide this process, the Act lists eight non-
exclusive factors that the court may consider in determining the fame of a
mark.153 Despite the presumed importance 54 of these factors in determin-
ing a mark's fame, the legislative history of the Act provides relatively
little guidance on their application. 155 Commentators have criticized the
courts' lack of consistency in determining which marks are famous.
Criticism of the FTDA's guidance for determining the fame of a mark
began early when Jonathan E. Moskin, 156 a witness at the Subcommittee
hearings, criticized the proposed Act for failing to adequately define how
famous a mark must be to merit protection.157 In fact, he offered an alterna-
tive draft of the legislation in which the PTO would make determinations
of the fame of a mark ex ante. 158 Additional criticism followed the passage
of the Act, with calls for Congress to limit dilution protection to "truly"
famous marks and complaints that the lack of a "clear and concrete defini-
tion" of fame in the statute sometimes leads to overprotecting marks used
in niche markets. 159 Commentators further recognized that different circuits
determine the fame of a mark using conflicting methods, and voiced the
152. See infra Part III.C.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(I)(A)-(H) (2000).
154. The Act lists no other criteria for the determination of fame.
155. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034 (de-
scribing the factors in the final version of the FTDA); USTA Report, supra note 56, at 458-60 (describ-
ing the virtually identical factors in the original USTA proposed act and expecting the courts to define
"famous mark" on a case-by-case basis).
156. Jonathan E. Moskin is an attorney, with the New York intellectual property law firm Pennie &
Edmonds at the time of the hearings, and has published on the topic of trademark dilution. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret. Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act?, 93
TRADEMARK REP. 842 (2003).
157. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 158 (statement of Jonathan E. Moskin).
158. Id. The record does not contain any indication that Moskin's proposed substitute draft of the
act was ever considered.
159. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 31, at 1396 (calling for Congress to amend the FTDA to "in-
crease the likelihood that only 'truly' famous marks will qualify for the FTDA's protection"); Heidi L.
Belongia, Note, Why is Fame Still Confusing? Misuse of the "Niche Market Theory" Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2002) (finding that the FTDA lacks a "clear
and concrete" definition of fame); see generally Marjorie A. Shields, What Constitutes "Famous Mark"
for Purposes of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c), Which Provides Remedies
for Dilution of Famous Marks, 165 A.L.R. FED. 625 (2000) (juxtaposing various marks in several
industries and settings that have been adjudicated famous or not famous).
[Vol 81:235
IT'S AS CLEAR AS MUD
very salient complaint that a lack of predictability in determining a mark's
fame makes it quite difficult for attorneys to provide their clients with
meaningful guidance as to which marks they may safely invest in-a situa-
tion that can only lead to higher avoidance costs. 160
The cases of Wilcom Pty. Ltd. v. Endless Visions161 and Avery Denni-
son Corp. v. Sumpton162 illustrate well the unpredictability in determining
the fame of a mark. In Wilcom the court only cursorily examined the fame
determination factors listed in the FTDA and determined that an embroi-
dery software company's mark was famous because the mark had been
"used, advertised, and promoted extensively throughout the United States"
and internationally for nearly twenty years. 163 The court concluded that the
mark had become well known to the public as identifying quality embroi-
dery software products. 164 However, less than one year later, the court in
Avery held that an office supply company's marks were not famous, despite
being advertised extensively and used for nearly a century, both nationally
and internationally. 165 The plaintiff in Avery presented more evidence that
its mark was associated with its products in the public mind than did the
plaintiff in Wilcom; yet the court held that it had only established the exis-
tence of secondary meaning, not fame. 166 With such divergent standards for
determining the fame of a mark, particularly when occurring within such a
short time frame, there is little wonder that this aspect of FTDA case law
has attracted criticism.
The courts' treatment of two factors listed in the Act for determining
the fame of a mark warrant particular attention. The first of these two fac-
tors is "the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark." 167
"Distinctiveness" is a term of art in the trademark regime, and a mark must
posses it to be protected against either infringement or dilution.168 The
160. See, e.g., Jacqueline R. Knapp, Note, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act: The Circuit Split
Makes a Desperate Call to the Supreme Court for Uniformity, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 853, 864-74
(2003) (identifying the different approaches that different circuits take in determining fame); Stephen
W. Feingold, Carole E. Klinger & Erica D. Klein, Circuits Struggle with Dilution Law's Lack of Clar-
ity, NAT'L L. J., May 1, 2000 at C9 (exploring the various circuits' determinations of fame and posing
the question, "how many trademark attorneys would have predicted that 'Panavision' or 'Intermatic'
would be found to be famous marks?").
161. 128 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
162. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
163. 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
164. Id.
165. 189 F.3dat 877-79.
166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (2000).
168. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:2; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (listing de ree of distinctive-
ness as a factor in determining fame of a mark).
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distinctiveness of a mark falls into one of four graduated categories: (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. 169
Generic marks, as the category designation implies, refer to a general class
of items or services (e.g., "automobile" or "transportation") that contain no
distinctiveness and can never be protected as trademarks. 170 A descriptive
mark is one which describes some attribute, dimension or quality of a
product (e.g., VISION CENTER for an optometry business) that normally
contains no distinctiveness and is not initially granted any trademark pro-
tection. 171 However, if a descriptive mark achieves "secondary meaning,"
that is, if the mark owner can show an established link to a product or ser-
vice in the minds of potential customers, then the mark will be considered
to have acquired distinctiveness and can be protected under trademark
law. 172 Suggestive marks, which simply imply a product (e.g., COPPER-
TONE), and arbitrary or fanciful marks, which are words that are totally
unknown in the language or are completely out of common usage (e.g.,
KODAK), are inherently distinctive and presumed to be protectable as
trademarks. 173
Some courts have read into the FTDA a requirement that a mark must
possess inherent distinctiveness to qualify for protection under the Act. 174
These courts interpret the Act to require both inherent distinctiveness,
which descriptive marks do not possess, and acquired distinctiveness,
which these courts equate to fame; and no amount of acquired distinctive-
ness will compensate for a lack of inherent distinctiveness. 175 This interpre-
tation of the FTDA's "degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness" factor
is completely contrary to Congress's intention. 176 The House Report on the
Act clearly states that "[this] factor makes it clear that a mark may be
deemed 'famous' even if not inherently distinctive, that is, even if the mark
is not arbitrary, fanciful, or coined."'177 This language makes it clear that
the line of case law requiring both inherent and acquired distinctiveness is
patently contrary to the intent of Congress.
The second factor for determining the fame of a mark that warrants
particular attention is "the geographical extent of the trading area in which
169. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 11:2.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. §§ 11:2, 11:5.
174. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d27,47 (1st Cir. 1998); accord TCPIP
Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
175. TCPIP Holding, 244 F.3d at 98.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
177. Id.
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the mark is used."' 178 Some courts have held marks to be famous despite a
very limited geographic basis of fame. 179 These marks include the name of
a chain of convenience stores in a five state region and a professional or-
ganization with members principally in a single (albeit populous) state. 180
The House Report on the FTDA advises that, to be protected under the Act,
"[t]he geographic fame of the mark must extend throughout a substantial
portion of the U.S. ' 181 Consequently, Congress never intended to protect
marks with such limited fame from dilution with a federal cause of action,
and granting such marks protection under the FTDA, rather than under
state dilution law, is inconsistent with the Act's purpose. 182
These criticisms of the FTDA's guidance for determining the fame of
a mark, coupled with inconsistent case law, some of which runs completely
contrary to the intention of Congress, illustrate one shortcoming of the Act.
Creating an ex ante registration system for designating famous marks will
significantly improve the Act and address many of the criticisms described
above. 183
B. Does the Act Require Actual Harm?
The exact delineation of what constitutes dilution, and what the lan-
guage of the FTDA precludes, have created significant confusion and dif-
ference of opinion in the courts. The language of the Act prohibits a junior
user's commercial use in commerce of a mark that "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark. .".. -184 It goes on to define dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(l) competi-
tion between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likeli-
hood of confusion, mistake, or deception."' 185 The interpretation of this
language developed into a circuit split over whether dilution under the
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(1)(D) (2000).
179. See, e.g., WaWa, Inc. v. Haaf, Civ. A. No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083, 1-2, 1996 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 11494, 2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996); accord N.Y. St. Soc. of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric
Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
180. WaWa, Inc., 1996 WL 460083, at 1-2, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11494, at 2 (finding WAWA to
be a famous mark); Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (finding NYSSCPA to be a famous
mark).
181. H.R.REP.NO. 104-374,at7.
182. However, the willingness of the courts to extend the protection of the FTDA to marks with
such limited fame appears to be on the decline. See Long, supra note 31, at 37.
183. See infra, Part IV.A. for a description of this system.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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FTDA required actual harm to the famous mark. 186 In Moseley the Su-
preme Court resolved the split, but the Court's holding promptly created
another debate in the lower courts-how to prove dilution. 187
Two cases from 1999 illustrate the original split well. In Nabisco, Inc.
v. PF Brands, Inc, the Second Circuit held that "[t]o require proof of actual
loss of revenue seems inappropriate," and that to require a showing of ac-
tual dilution relied on "excessive literalism" in the reading of the statute. 188
The court went on to reason that a requirement of actual dilution would
defeat the intent of the FTDA by preventing injunctive relief before the
actual harm occurred. 189 Opposing this view was the Fourth Circuit as ex-
plained in Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development.190 In this case, the court read the Act liter-
ally and held that it required "actual, consummated dilution," rather than
the mere likelihood of dilution proscribed by many state dilution stat-
utes. 191 Its principal rationale for reading the Act literally was its departure
from the proscriptive language traditionally found in most state dilution
statutes. 192 It went on to hold that "the lessening of the capacity of a fa-
mous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services" meant that the
mark's selling power had to be harmed by the junior use of the mark, and
that plaintiffs must prove this harm to prevail under the federal statute.1 93
In 2003, this issue reached the Supreme Court in the case of Moseley
v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc. 194 The Court sided with the Fourth Circuit by
holding that famous mark owners must show actual dilution of their mark
to receive injunctive relief under the FTDA. 195 The Court endorsed the
literal reading of the Act's requirement that a junior use of a mark cause
dilution of a famous mark because of the contrast between this wording and
186. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 518 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (noting that the Sixth
Circuit, below, held that the language of the FTDA only required a showing of likelihood of dilution,
which "expressly rejected" the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), that a finding of
dilution under the FTDA required a finding of actual economic harm).
187. See Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting in dicta that "[t]he
Court did not explain and no one seems to know what that "circumstantial evidence" [a method by
which, the Court suggested, actual dilution might be shown without a showing of actual economic
harm] might be").
188. 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that it was not entirely clear how the
courts should determine when a junior user causes dilution of a famous mark).
189. Id. at 224.
190. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
191. Id. at 458.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 518 U.S. 418 (2003).
195. Id. at 433.
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the "likelihood of dilution" wording found in state law statutes, as well as
the mention in other portions of the FTDA and the broader Lanham Act of
similar "likelihood" of harm language. 196 In light of the repeated references
to likelihood of harm, the Court reasoned, Congress would not have used
the phrase "causes dilution" if it did not intend that actual dilution occur
before relief could be granted under the statute. 197
The Court did not entirely agree with the Fourth Circuit though. 198 It
stated that a showing of actual dilution did not require a showing of actual
loss of sales or profits attributable to the dilution. 199 Although it acknowl-
edged that consumer surveys and other means of demonstrating actual dilu-
tion are costly and often unreliable, the Court cautioned that such
difficulties are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with an essential
element of the cause of action under the Act. 200 However, it did suggest
that "direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be nec-
essary if actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evi-
dence-the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are
identical," which was not the case in Moseley.201
This concluding statement about the use of circumstantial evidence to
prove actual dilution quickly touched off another split among the lower
federal courts as they questioned whether identity of the famous mark and
the junior mark constituted the circumstantial evidence the Court referred
to in Moseley.202 The majority of post-Moseley decisions to consider the
issue have concluded that identity of the marks is indeed adequate circum-
stantial evidence of actual dilution.203 However, a minority of courts have
questioned whether the Court's statement instead means that dilution can
be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, if and only if the marks are
identical. 204
196. Id. at 432-33.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 433.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 434.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
203. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich.
2004); accord Amer. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1085 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) ("[W]hen identical marks are used on similar goods, dilution... obviously occurs.").
204. See, e.g., Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (failing to reach a determination on the issue and deciding to deny summary judgment
so the issue could be presented to a jury); Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688,
695 (N.D. 111. 2004) (determining that there was evidence of actual dilution beyond the identity of the
marks); but see Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing Savin Corp. v.
Savin Group, 02 CIV. 9377, 2003 WL 22451731, at 14, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19220 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
24, 2003), which both Lee Middleton and Nike cite).
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The aforementioned history of court splits and confusion surrounding
the exact meaning of the phrase "causes dilution" in the FTDA, and how to
prove what this phrase requires, is ultimately the result of poor drafting.
The House Report does not explicitly clarify whether actual harm to the
marketing power of a mark must occur before the court may grant injunc-
tive relief under the Act.205 However, three specific passages in the Report
compel the reasonable and logical conclusion that Congress did not intend
to withhold the protection of the FTDA until after actual dilution occurs.
First, the Report states that the Act "is intended to protect famous marks
where the subsequent, unauthorized commercial use of such marks by oth-
ers dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark."'206 It is significant that the Re-
port does not refer to a dilution of the selling power or commercial value of
a mark, but rather the distinctiveness. Presumably, the junior use of a fa-
mous mark begins to dilute the distinctiveness of the mark immediately,
before any actual decrease in its commercial value can be measured. Sec-
ondly, the Report explains that "dilution is an infection, which if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark. '207 This
latter statement-that dilution leads to an economic harm-should be read
to mean that Congress intended the FTDA to stop a diluting junior use
before it causes measurable harm to the famous mark. 208 Lastly, the Report
asserts that dilution is conceptually different from infringement in that "it
applies when the unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's
perception [that] the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particu-
lar."'209 The Report then listed the following examples of actionable junior
uses of a famous mark: DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK
pianos. 210 These examples lend credible support to the contention that iden-
tity of a famous and a junior mark is proof of dilution under the Act; once a
junior user applies the mark to its products, the mark no longer signifies
something particular.
Furthermore, the history of the FTDA makes clear that the vast major-
ity of the language in the Act was lifted verbatim from the 1987 USTA
proposal. 211 The USTA based the language of the statute proposed in 1987
205. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
206. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
207. Id. (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
208. This is the same interpretation of this passage made by the Court of Appeals in Moseley. V.
Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
While the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule the reasoning on this point, its overturning of the
case can be viewed as an implicit disagreement.
209. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3.
210. Id.
211. SeesupraPartl.
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on existing statutes that required only a likelihood of dilution standard.212
The lengthy and detailed report of the USTA, which contained the pro-
posed statute and analyzed it thoroughly, made no mention of a reason to
change the prohibition in a federal statute from the likelihood of dilution to
an actual dilution standard.213 However, the Report did describe famous
marks as "likely to be harmed by reduced distinctiveness ... enormously
valuable but fragile assets, [and] susceptible to irreversible injury from
promiscuous use." 214 It also suggested that they "be accorded maximum
legal protection. '215 This language is not easily reconciled with the notion
that a famous mark must suffer actual harm before injunctive relief may be
granted. Further, the Report cautioned that the "proposed statutory lan-
guage is not intended as a final [USTA] recommendation .... ," 216 Its sole
purpose was to provide an example which incorporated various principles
the USTA espoused and "to stimulate discussion. '2 17 Had Congress re-
ceived proposed legislation from the USTA that included likelihood of
dilution language and changed it to the "caused dilution" language, the
necessary interpretation would be that Congress opposed the former stan-
dard and preferred the latter. This, however, did not occur. Congress re-
ceived a detailed draft of proposed legislation from the USTA
recommending "maximum legal protection" for famous marks and enacted
it with a few minor modifications. 218 This article interprets this sequence of
events as a drafting oversight by the USTA, not a conscious decision on the
part of Congress to withhold federal dilution protection for famous marks
until after the distinctiveness of the mark has been diluted.
This contention is strengthened by the FTDA's principle remedy.
Unless a junior use that dilutes a famous mark is willful, the Act limits
relief to an injunction.219 As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opin-
ion in Moseley, the "essential role of injunctive relief is to prevent future
wrong, although no right has yet been violated. '220 He continued, "A
holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of the mark's ca-
212. See Dilution and Well-Known Marks Comm. of INTA, Proof of Dilution in the United States,
I http://www.inta.org/membersonly/downloads/ref-proof.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2005); USTA
Report, supra note 56, at 454.
213. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 454.
214. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at456.
216. Id. at 458.
217. Id.
218. See supra Part I.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2) (2000).
220. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 436 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Swift & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928)) (internal quotes removed).
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pacity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the damage is
done and the distinctiveness of the mark has been eroded."'221
It is apparent from the legislative history that Congress did not assert
any justification, purpose, or reason for using the statutory language
"causes dilution" in the FTDA. In fact, the record shows no acknowledge-
ment that Congress had any intention to deviate from the predominant form
of dilution protection available at the state level when it enacted the Act.
Additionally, the only remedy available under the statute (for dilution that
is not willful) is incomplete if the owner of a famous mark is denied relief
until "the damage is done" to his mark.222 All of this points to the conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend to raise the bar in this way for owners of
famous marks and that Congress should amend the FTDA to ensure effec-
tive relief for these mark owners.223
C. Logical Inconsistency of the Remedy
Even assuming that Congress intended the FTDA to contain a stricter
standard for the granting of injunctive relief ("causes dilution") than that
available under most state dilution laws ("likelihood of dilution"), the se-
lection of that standard works to undercut other stated goals of the Act. As
detailed above, Congress intended to create a federal cause of action to
protect famous marks, which are typically used nationwide.224 Congress
recognized that the "patch-quilt" nature of state dilution statutes led to in-
complete protection for famous marks, forum-shopping, and increased
litigation.225 However, in the post-Moseley world, Congress's clearly-stated
goal of effective federal dilution protection is at risk.
Since Moseley, practitioners226 and student commentators227 have rec-
ommended reevaluating, and possibly returning to, state dilution law claims
as a viable alternative to the FTDA for owners of famous marks. This ap-
221. Id.
222. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. See infra Part IV.B.
224. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
225. Id.
226. See Paul W. Reidl, Understanding Basic Trademark Law: A Primer on Global Trademark
Protection, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 2004 243, 271 (Practicing Law Institute,
Course Handbook) (predicting that dilution claims under state law will not be limited by the Supreme
Court's holding in Moseley); Dyan Finguerra-Ducharme, Proving Dilution of a Trademark After 'Mose-
ley,' N.Y.L.J., June 3, 2004, at 4 (encouraging New York litigators to bring dilution claims under state
law to avoid the higher standard of Moseley).
227. See, e.g., Jessica Kaiser, Victor's Not So Little Secret: Trademark Dilution is Difficult But Not
Impossible to Prove Following Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 425, 445
(2005).
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proach will certainly be one appealing alternative for famous mark owners,
particularly when, as in Moseley, the junior user's mark is very similar but
not identical to the famous mark, making proof of actual dilution more
burdensome. Under most state dilution laws, just as under the FTDA, a
junior mark does not have to be identical to dilute a famous mark;228 but,
post-Moseley, famous mark owners pressing state law claims have the ad-
vantage of only needing to prove a likelihood of dilution. Should such a
preference for protecting nationally famous marks through state dilution
actions increase, Congress's goal for the FTDA-reducing forum-shopping
and litigation-will be defeated. Considering the significance Congress
placed on creating a federal cause of action for nationally famous marks,229
and the lack of any evidence in the legislative history that Congress in-
tended to require famous mark owners litigating under the FTDA to be
saddled with the stricter "caused dilution" standard, Congress must act to
amend the FTDA to further the original purpose of the Act.
IV. A PLAN FOR AMENDMENT
In light of the history and purpose of the FTDA and the Act's short-
comings, this article proposes that Congress amend the FTDA to: (1) create
a famous mark registry; and (2) change the language of the Act to explicitly
permit injunctive relief upon a showing of a junior user's likelihood of
diluting a famous mark. Following the proposal for amendment, this sec-
tion will review the recommended amendment's implications for interna-
tional protection of famous marks. Finally, this section will review a
proposed amendment before Congress at the time of this writing and iden-
tify its shortcomings in addressing the flaws in the current FTDA.
A. Creation of a Registry of Famous Marks
The first change Congress should make to the FTDA is to create a
"famous mark registry" system, administered by the PTO, through which
ex ante determinations of the fame of a mark can be established. The con-
cept of a famous mark registry is not a new idea;230 commentators have
228. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming a
preliminary injunction granted under the FTDA and the New York state dilution law against the distri-
bution of a fish-shaped cracker that resembled, but was not identical to the plaintiffs fish-shaped
cracker).
229. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4.
230. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 412-13. In preparing it's 1988 proposal, the USTA consid-
ered the creation of a "Strong Mark Register" for protection of a special category of distinctive marks
(i.e., famous), but declined to recommend such a register in favor of a new dilution provision; the
2006]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
been calling for such a registry since the FTDA was enacted. 231 During
Jonathan Moskin's testimony on the adoption of the Act before the House
Subcommittee, he proposed alternate legislation that included such a provi-
sion.232 Under his plan, the Commissioner of Trademarks would certify a
mark as famous upon petition by a mark owner, providing greater certainty
to the famous mark owner and to users of similar or identical junior marks
before they made significant investments in the marks. 233
This article proposes a different interplay between a famous mark reg-
istry system and the existing form of the FTDA. Whereas other recom-
mended fame registries would place determining the fame of a mark
exclusively in the hands of the PTO,234 this article proposes a hybrid sys-
tem, with both the PTO and courts determining the fame of marks. Under
this proposed system, owners of famous marks can submit those marks for
review by the PTO and, if the PTO determines that the mark is truly fa-
mous, registration in the new famous mark register. Once registered, the
mark would be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of fame; however, the
courts would still ultimately determine the fame of a mark. The fame of
marks not in the famous mark register would not be presumed but could be
proven in court just as is done currently.
The system of review and registration by the PTO under this proposal
would operate very much like the current process for assigning incontest-
able status to a federally registered mark. The mere registration of a trade-
mark with the PTO does not grant exclusive rights to use the mark;
registration is merely a claim to that mark, which can be used as prima
facie evidence of the mark's validity, its registration, and its ownership. 235
After five years of continuous use of a mark in commerce, and the satisfac-
tion of certain procedural elements, including the filing of an affidavit by
Report does not indicate whether any consideration was given to combining the concept of a new
register with the new provision.
231. See Moskin, supra note 156, at 863 (proposing an amendment to the FTDA, assigning the
determination of fame to the Commissioner of Trademarks); Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registra-
tion System for Famous Trademarks, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1097, 1100-02 (2003) (Assistant Professor
of Law at Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville, advocating both the creation of a
"fame register," and requiring registration in the register prior to any FTDA protection, and the preemp-
tion of state dilution laws by the FTDA); Kenneth L. Port, The Trademark Super Register: A Response
to Professor Smith, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 881, 882 (2004) (Professor of Law at William Mitchell Col-
lege of Law arguing in support of Professor Lars Smith's recommended "fame register").
232. 1995 Hearing, supra note 99, at 157 (testimony of Jonathan E. Moskin).
233. Id.
234. Smith, stpra note 231, at 1102.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2000).
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the mark owner, the PTO holds a mark to be incontestable.236 Incontest-
ability is conclusive evidence of the validity of a mark, the validity of its
registration, and the registrant's ownership of the mark.237 The Supreme
Court described incontestability as "a means for the registrant to quiet title
in the ownership of his mark. ' 238 Despite the stronger evidence of validity
that incontestability provides a mark owner, however, the presumption of
validity can be overcome by a junior user through several statutory de-
fenses. 239
Determinations of fame under the famous mark registry proposed
herein would function very similarly to the assignment of incontestable
status. Mark owners who believe their marks are famous, and therefore
should be protected from dilution by the FTDA, can file a petition with the
PTO for famous mark status. The PTO can apply the eight factors laid out
in the Act and make a determination of fame ex ante. The process would
include an "interference" 240 period during which junior users of an identi-
cal or similar mark may contest the grant of famous mark status. Most im-
portantly, as in the case of incontestable status, the grant of famous mark
status would be conclusive, but not irrefutable evidence of a mark's fame,
entitling the mark owner to a presumption of the fame of his mark. In any
subsequent litigation, the PTO's determination of fame, like most agency
action, 241 would be entitled to judicial deference but could still be over-
come by a defendant under any circumstances Congress or the PTO define
or at the court's discretion for substantial policy reasons.
The recommended registry would provide better notice to new market
entrants that a prior user considers its mark famous, that the PTO agrees,
and that the mark is therefore very likely entitled to the broader protection
of the FTDA.242 Such notice would substantially lower avoidance costs for
any potential junior users by permitting them to simply review the famous
mark register and avoid the use of a mark therein-a mark that is very
236. 15 U.S.C. § 1065; see generally Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestabil-
ity, 26 IND. L. REV. 519 (2003). Note that incontestable status can be challenged by holders of the same
or a similar mark.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
238. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citing Hearings on H.
R. 82 before the Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 21 (1944) (remarks of Rep.
Lanham)).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
240. Under current federal trademark law, an interference is an opposition to the registration of a
trademark filed by another user of the same or similar mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
241. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding
that courts must defer to any agency action that is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of a statute
the agency is charged with implementing).
242. Port, supra note 231, at 892.
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likely to be protected under the FTDA. The system would further allow
existing junior users to challenge the famous nature of a senior mark before
the PTO's determination of fame and prior to any dilution of the senior
mark-a time when the senior user has not yet suffered any harm, accumu-
lated litigation expenses should be lower, and some form of settlement may
be more likely.
Additionally, the structure of this proposal will not contradict a sig-
nificant concern that Congress voiced while considering the FTDA-that
requiring the federal registration of a famous mark would "undercut the
Unites States position with our trading partners, which is that famous
marks should be protected regardless of whether the marks are registered in
the country where protection is sought. '243 The proposed famous mark
register is compatible with this goal because it will only serve to enhance
the protection of famous marks; it will not restrict dilution protection to
registered marks. Any mark, registered or not, may still be protected under
the terms of the Act as it now exists. Registration only serves to aid in de-
termining the fame of a mark.
This proposed registry has the potential to add substantial stability and
uniformity to determinations of the fame of a mark. As explored above,
determinations of a mark's fame vary widely from court to court. 244 Fur-
thermore, determinations of fame have also varied over time.245 This fluc-
tuation in the character of a famous mark should be quickly stabilized
under this proposal. The PTO, through expert knowledge of the subject
matter and sheer repetition 246 would rapidly develop a broad, consistent,
and comprehensive body of precedent, which courts could then utilize as
guidance in determining the fame of non-registered marks. Also, the PTO
could, with Congress's authorization and guidance, promulgate regulations
to further refine the factors that the FTDA lays out for determining the
fame of a mark. Through such notice and comment rulemaking, the PTO
could obtain the feedback of large and small mark owners and other con-
cerned parties to any proposed regulations.
243. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
244. See supra Part III.A.
245. See Long, supra note 3 1, at 36-37 (finding courts to be less likely to hold a mark famous as
time has passed).
246. Currently, fame is only determined during litigation. Under this proposal, mark owners will
petition for a fame determination proactively to protect their marks, with the likely results of substan-
tially more marks being reviewed according to the factors laid out in the FTDA.
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It bears mentioning that INTA opposes any mandatory registration
system for famous marks, 247 and therefore has been presumed to oppose a
famous mark registry.248 While INTA has not commented on a non-
mandatory register of the type proposed here, it is reasonable to assume
that it would not oppose such a register. A registry of this type can only
assist the owners of famous marks in protecting their marks from dilution,
while lowering litigation costs. Considering that INTA's membership
represents the interests of famous mark owners, 249 it should welcome a
famous mark register as proposed herein.
Creating a famous mark register will not reduce the reach of the pro-
tection currently available under the FTDA. It will not endanger the inter-
ests of famous mark owners in the United States attempting to obtain
protection for their marks internationally. It will not infringe the traditional
power of the courts to weigh policy considerations when ruling on the spe-
cific set of facts before them. It will create stability in an important area of
intellectual property law where stability has been notably lacking. It will
also provide more predictability to junior users of marks, who currently
must make their investments in a mark without any predictable assurance
that their use of that mark will not be terminated unexpectedly. A famous
mark register will add efficiency and predictability to the protection of
famous marks without diminishing any protection available under the cur-
rent Act.
B. Injunctive Relief For Likelihood of Causing Dilution
Congress should also amend the FTDA to explicitly provide injunctive
relief for junior use of a mark that creates a "likelihood of dilution." As
examined above,250 the legislative history of the Act does not reveal any
explicit intention to depart from the "likelihood of dilution" standard that is
generally applied in the state dilution statutes, on which the FTDA is mod-
eled. Furthermore, the USTA proposal to Congress, from which the lan-
guage of the Act was taken, asserted that famous marks should be given
"maximum legal protection. ' '251 The current interpretation of the Act re-
quires a showing of actual harm (though not economic harm) to the distinc-
247. See Issues and Policies Committee of INTA, Request for Action by the INTA Board of Direc-
tors: "Well-known" Marks Protection, at para. 5 (Sept. 18, 1996), http://www.inta.org/policy/
res wellknown96.html.
248. See Port, supra note 231, at 890.
249. Id.
250. See supra Part IlI.C.
251. USTA Report, supra note 56, at 456.
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tive quality of a famous mark before injunctive relief will be granted. 252
This interpretation of the Act, though consistent with the literal language of
the Act, is clearly contradictory to Congress's intention when passing the
Act.253 The requirement that a famous mark suffer actual dilution before
the FTDA will provide a remedy is clearly inconsistent with the nature of
that remedy-an injunction. Requiring the owner of a famous mark, threat-
ened with dilution of the mark's distinctiveness, to wait until the damage is
done before granting an injunction is contrary to the principles of equity. 254
Various commentators, 255 including INTA, 256 have called on Con-
gress to clarify the language of the Act to make it consistent with its origi-
nal purposes. Congress has heard this call. 257 Now is the time for Congress
to act by amending the language of the FTDA to clearly proscribe any jun-
ior use of a famous mark that creates a likelihood of dilution.
C. International Implications
Any proposal to amend the FTDA must be made in light of the United
States' desire to lead the world in protecting intellectual property and the
reality of a global economy in which famous marks are routinely used in
foreign countries. 258 The famous mark register proposed herein comports
well with international agreements and foreign law in three significant
ways: it would further the goals of existing international agreements and
aid owners of famous U.S. marks; it is not novel in the international com-
252. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
253. See supra Part II.B.
254. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Equity principles encourage those who
are injured to assert their rights promptly. A holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of
the mark's capacity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the damage is done and the
distinctiveness of the mark has been eroded.").
255. See, e.g., Julie C. Frymark, Note, Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection from
Spreading, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 165, 213 (2003) (recommending Congress amend the FTDA to reflect a
likelihood of dilution standard); Jennifer Mae Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV.
121, 124 (2000).
256. See U.S. Legis. Subcomm. of the Legis. Analysis Comm. of INTA, Request for Action by the
INTA Board of Directors: Appropriate Standard for Establishing a Dilution Claim (Sept. 15, 1999),
http://www.inta.org/policy/res-dilutclaim.html (resolving "that INTA endorses likelihood of dilution as
the appropriate standard for establishing a dilution claim"); Comm. Print to Amend the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5-6 [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (2004) (statement of
Jacqueline A. Leimer, President of INTA) (calling on Congress to clarify the language of the FTDA to
clearly provide relief for uses causing a likelihood of dilution by blurring or a likelihood of dilution by
tamishment).
257. See generally 2004 Hearing, supra note 256; see infra Part IV.D.
258. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031; Welko-
witz, supra note 143, at 64-65 (describing global trade as a force for harmonizing trademark law).
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munity; and it will provide the United States an opportunity to lead the
world in the ex ante protection of the distinctive quality of famous marks.
As noted above, the FTDA was enacted, in part, to harmonize U.S.
law with the TRIPS agreement and the Paris Convention.259 Pursuant to
those agreements the owner of a famous mark260 may, under certain cir-
cumstances, compel a foreign country to cancel the registration (and enjoin
the use) of a mark if a competent authority of the country where the famous
mark is registered or used considers the mark sufficiently famous. 261 A
famous mark registry would significantly benefit owners of famous U.S.
marks. Under the current language of the FTDA, the only nationally com-
petent authority for determining the fame of a mark in the U.S. is a federal
court.2 6 2 Considering the unavailability of advisory opinions in the federal
system, this leads to an inefficient mode of relief for owners of famous
U.S. marks, who must sue a junior mark user to receive a determination
that their marks are indeed famous. Creating a famous mark registry would
allow the owners of these marks to obtain determinations of the fame of
their marks directly from the PTO and to use those determinations when
seeking relief under TRIPS or the Paris Convention.
The creation of a U.S. famous mark registry would not be novel or
unique in the international community and would therefore be more likely
to be accepted by foreign mark owners and adopted by foreign countries
currently lacking such a registry. At this time, Japan, Taiwan, China, and
other nations have a "defensive mark" registration system, which provides
enhanced protection to famous marks. 263 Under the Japanese defensive
mark system,264 for instance, a "widely recognized" mark can be registered
in association with additional goods or services, apart from those with
which it was originally registered.265 Once the widely recognized mark has
been registered for use on the additional goods or services, the owner of the
mark may exclude the use of another's identical or similar mark on those
259. See supra Part II.B.3.
260. As noted above, TRIPS and the Paris Convention refer to "well-known" marks rather than
famous marks. The term famous mark here is used for consistency with the FTDA and the proposed
register of famous marks.
261. TRIPS, Article 16, supra note 133, at 1203-04; Paris Convention Article 6bis, supra note 134.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (stating that "In determining whether a mark is... famous, a court
may consider factors such as .... ).
263. Port, supra note 231, at 891.
264. Shohyoho [Trademark Act], Law No. 127 of 1959 (as amended), arts. 64-68. See Port, supra
note 231, at 891.
265. In Japan, the registration of a mark only protects the mark for use on the goods or services for
which it was specifically registered. Port, supra note 231, at 891.
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goods, even if the owner of the widely known mark never has and never
intends to use his mark on the additional goods or services. 266
The Russian Federation, a party to the Paris Convention, also has an
ex ante system for the protection and advance registration of famous
marks. 267 Under the Russian system, the owner of a famous mark may file
a Request with the Board of Patent Disputes that its mark be added to the
List of well-known trademarks of the Russian Federation. 268 The Request
may contain various data, including advertising amounts, sales volumes,
market share, consumer surveys, or any other relevant data tending to prove
the fame of the mark. 269 If the Board finds that the mark has become
"widely known" to consumers in the Russian Federation, it will be added to
the List.270 Once the mark is added to the List, the owner of the famous
mark may prevent the junior use of the mark on goods dissimilar to those
on which the famous mark owner uses it, so long as he can show an asso-
ciation between the famous and the junior mark among consumers that
"may infringe upon his lawful interests. '271
Creating a famous mark register would provide an excellent opportu-
nity for the United States to take a true leadership position in the protection
of intellectual property. TRIPS has 148 signatory nations272 who, by the
terms of the agreement, 273 must afford a higher level of protection to fa-
mous marks than is typically afforded to non-famous marks. By creating an
efficient ex ante system for determining the fame of a mark, the U.S. can
establish a model for any of these nations who do not already have a non-
judicial system to make this determination of fame before litigation. Such a
system would have the added advantage of providing notice to potential
market entrants, lowering costs to them and to the owners of famous marks.
Ultimately, if widely adopted, a famous mark registry system could be
combined with the Madrid System to create an efficient method of register-
ing famous marks in member countries.
266. Id.
267. Bella I. Safro & Thomas S. Keaty, What's in a Name? Protection of Well-Known Trademarks
Under International and National Law, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 58-59 (2004).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and
Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005)
(identifying 148 signatory nations as of February 16, 2005).
273. See generally TRIPS, Article 16, supra note 133.
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D. Current Legislative Proposal
During the writing of this article, Representative Lamar Smith, Chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property, introduced a bill to amend the FTDA.274 The bill, referred to as
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 ("TDRA"), is not intended to
significantly alter federal dilution protection, but rather to clarify what
Congress intended when it passed the FTDA.2 75 The House Judiciary
Committee, after hearing testimony in 2004 and 2005,276 concluded that the
actual harm standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the Moseley deci-
sion creates an undue burden for owners of famous marks and is not what
Congress intended.2 77 Furthermore, the Committee stated its concern about
the lack of uniformity in interpretation of several provisions of the FTDA
by the various circuits. 278 Most notably, it pointed to the circuit split on
what constitutes a famous mark.279
Although it would not make sweeping changes to federal dilution law,
the TDRA significantly alters the current language of the FTDA. 2 80 It
would firmly overrule the actual dilution standard articulated in Moseley by
removing the "causes dilution" language from the current Act and, instead,
prohibiting junior use of a mark "that is likely to cause dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark .... ,,281 The TDRA also
would resolve the split over what type of distinctiveness a mark must pos-
sess to be protected under federal law. Under the current Act, some courts
have held that marks must possess both inherent and acquired distinctive-
274. H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (introduced Feb. 9, 2005, passed by the House on
April 19, 2005, and introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on April
20, 2005).
275. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the House Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 Hearing] (opening statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
276. This is a reference to the Hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property.
277. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005).
278. Id.
279. Id. The Committee also specifically mentioned the split over whether marks with only ac-
quired distinctiveness and not inherent distinctiveness are protected under the FTDA, id.-illustrated by
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004). Lastly, the Committee mentioned a split over
whether the FTDA applies to dilution by tarnishment, as well as dilution by blurring. H.R. REP. No.
109-23, at 5-6. While this article does not identify this particular split as a significant issue in FTDA
jurisprudence, witnesses at the House Hearings addressed it. See 2005 Hearing, supra note 275, at 10
(prepared statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, INTA), 24 (statement of William G. Barber,
Partner, Fulbright and Jaworski, LLP., on behalf of the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Assoc).
280. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) with H.R. 683, 109th Congress, § 2 (1st Sess. 2005).
281. H.R.683,at§2.
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ness, 282 but the TDRA would clearly protect "famous mark[s] that [are]
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness," thereby ending
the debate. 283
The Committee intends the TDRA to provide the courts with better
guidance in determining the fame of a mark than the current Act does.284
The Committee's optimism in this regard is difficult to understand. While
the TDRA does narrow the definition of a famous mark by requiring that to
be famous it must be "widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the Unites States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark's owner," it would provide little more guidance than the current
Act provides. 285 Whereas the current Act provides a list of eight nonexclu-
sive factors to guide courts in the determination of fame, 286 the TDRA lists
only three nonexclusive factors to guide the courts: the extent of advertis-
ing and publicity of the mark; the volume and geographic extent of sales
under the mark; and the extent of actual recognition of the mark.287
While the TDRA would be a step in the right direction, it falls short of
correcting every problem with the current language of the FTDA. Many
aspects of the TDRA are a significant improvement over the FTDA. The
TDRA clearly corrects the prohibitory language of the FTDA from the
actual dilution standard to the likely to dilute standard that Congress in-
tended and that existed in some Circuits before the Moseley decision.288 It
also elaborates on what constitutes dilution-detailing the boundaries for
both dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring, for which it lists six
factors that courts may consider in identifying cases of blurring. 289 How-
ever, it does virtually nothing to ensure a uniform judicial interpretation of
what makes a mark famous. Although it narrows the definition of famous
marks to those that are "widely recognized, ' 290 the basic format of the
bill-instructing the court to rely on any relevant factors and then listing a
few-will inherently lead to variations in interpretation in the various cir-
cuits, just as it has under the FTDA. The TDRA also does nothing to en-
282. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004).
283. H.R. 683, at § 2.
284. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 8.
285. H.R. 683, at § 2. Under the current Act, the degree of recognition of a mark is but one factor in
the determination of fame. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(I)(F).
286. 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(1)(A)-(H).
287. H.R. 683, at § 2.
288. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (stating that "actual dilution
must be established," and that a showing of a likelihood of dilution is insufficient for relief under the
FTDA). The Court impliedly rejected the likelihood of dilution standard utilized in some Circuits prior
to the Moseley decision. Id. at 428.
289. H.R. 683, at § 2.
290. Id.
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hance the position of famous U.S. mark owners seeking protection in for-
eign countries. To accomplish the original Congressional goal of providing
famous marks in nationwide use with uniform federal protection from dilu-
tion, determinations of fame should be made centrally. Without the inclu-
sion of a famous mark register, the TDRA is only half of the solution
needed in federal dilution protection.
CONCLUSION
The FTDA was enacted to foster stability in dilution protection for
owners of truly famous marks, and to give famous marks in nationwide use
the protection of nationwide injunctive relief.291 This goal has been handi-
capped by inconsistencies in determining fame, divergent case law, and an
inconsistency between the strict language of the Act and both its purpose
and remedy. To fulfill the original purpose of the Act, Congress must now
amend it to resolve these problems. Creating a famous mark registry sys-
tem and explicitly providing for injunctions upon a showing of a likelihood
of dilution will solve these problems. A famous mark registry will provide
significantly more certainty for the owners of famous marks, who invest
heavily in developing that fame, while alerting junior mark users to poten-
tial dilution problems before they invest in their marks. Providing for in-
junctive relief upon a showing of a likelihood of confusion will give the
owners of famous marks a viable remedy before their marks suffer actual
harm.
Legislation pending before Congress will fix half of the problem, but
fails to meaningfully address the problems in determining fame and does
not advance the position of U.S. famous mark owners pressing for protec-
tion internationally. A famous mark register will add stability and predict-
ability to the determining of fame. At the same time, the register will aid
owners of famous domestic marks used internationally to protect their
marks in other nations, while not offending our obligations under interna-
tional agreements. Congress enacted the FTDA to protect famous trade-
marks from a genuine threat; now it must enact the proposal presented
herein to make that protection predictable, efficient, and effective.
291. H.R.REP.No. 104-374,at3-4.
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